Nicu Popescu writes about EU - Georgia relations. The talking points [in English] are excellent and pretty much sum up the issues at stake here.

For me, the keyword that best describes the relationship between Brussels and Tbilsi is ‘asymmetry.’ As Nicu rightly points out, the EU has neither the muscle or political will to offer Georgia what it needs and wants in the short run, i.e. security guarantees, substantial political leverage in its negotiations with Russia, backed up by an increased aid flow through ENP and a strengthened economic partnership. Georgia is still semi-peripheral to the EU as a whole, although there are several states within the EU that have developed closer ties with Tbilisi [Romania, some of the Baltics, and to a certain extent Czech Republic and Poland].

Georgia has some crucial months ahead. It has passed the test of the most recent Parliamentary elections. I agree with Nicu that it still has to address the issue of an unruly, divisive and adversarial political life [although, in a way, this is 'normal' for a young emerging democracy]. As the new Parliament starts its session, the biggest internal challenge for Tbilisi will be to reinforce the image of a functioning, stable democracy. And I think internal political stability is key here.

In terms of its relationship with the EU, Tbilisi should scale down expectations and try to maximize the potential of its partnership. Georgia should be aware that the EU will not be able to alleviate its security situation - it just doesn’t fit Brussels’s modus operandi. Therefore, Tbilisi will have to rely on internal resources, on sustained US aid and on working hard for getting the Membership Action Plan in December.

What the EU can offer, however, is economic carrots by facilitating an opening of the Common Market to Georgian goods. Regardless of whether you believe in functionalism, an enhanced economic cooperation is more likely to spill over into more ‘relevant’ political areas than unrealistic expectations.

To achieve this, Tbilisi should work hard and stage a sustained PR campaign, with the purpose of projecting across the EU the image of a modernizing, Western-oriented, politically stable, and democratic Georgian state. It should work at bilateral level with key decision-makers in the EU, and use the countries that already support Georgia as a proxy in these undertakings. If successful, Georgia should be able to create an image across the EU that is somewhat similar to Israel’s image in the US. This should help create the momentum for realizing Georgia’s European aspirations.

And, as Nicu again rightly points out, both Georgia and the EU should start thinking of available options in case Georgia does not get the MAP in December.

The stake for Georgia is to transform the nature of what is currently an Asymmetric Partnership with the EU, into one where the EU feels it has a stake in Georgia.